Monday, December 19, 2011

Saying No to reinforcing hopeless situations

The last time it was necessary to say no to sending good resources into a hopeless situation.

It looks like George Osborne has learnt this lesson from the Euro. We have the Germans suddenly wanting to be all chummy with us so that we will sell out children into more debt to provide more money to burn on the Euro bonfire.

The time has come to say No and to keep repeating it.

Let Nick Clegg take his fortune and fat Euro pension and burn it on the funeral pyre of  the Euro - no other British tax payers should be required to.


                                                     May 16,1940
             I have the honour to refer to the very serious calls which have recently been made upon the Home Defence Fighter'Units in an attempt to stem the German invasion on the Continent.
  2,         I hope and believe that our Armies may yet be victorious in France and Belgium,  but we have to face the possibility that they may be defeated.
  3.         In this case I presume that there is no-one who will deny that England should fight on,  even though the remainder of  the Continent of Europe is dominated by the Germans.
  4.         For this purpose it is necessary to retain some  minimum fighter strength in this country and I must request that  the Air Council will inform me what they consider this minimum  strength to be,  in order that I may make my dispositions accordingly.
  5.         I would remind the Air Council that the last estimate which they made as to the force necessary to defend this country  was 52 Squadrons,  and my strength has now been reduced to the  equivalent of 36 Squadrons.
  6.         Once a decision has been reached as to the limit on  which the Air Council and the Cabinet are prepared to stake the  existence of the country,  it should be made clear to the Allied  Commanders on the Continent that not a single aeroplane from  Fighter Command beyond the limit will be sent across the Channel, no matter how desperate the situation may become.
  7.         It will, of course, be remembered that the estimate  of 52 Squadrons was based on the assumption that the attack  would come from the eastwards except in so far as the defences  might be outflanked in flight.   We have now to face the  possibility that attacks may come from Spain or even from the North coast of France.   The result is that our line is very  much extended at the same time as our resources are reduced.
  8.         I must point out that within the last few days the  equivalent of 10 Squadrons have been sent to France,  that the  Hurricane Squadrons remaining in this country are seriously  depleted,  and that the more Squadrons which are sent to France  the higher will be the wastage and the more insistent the demands for reinforcements.
  9.         I must therefore request that as a matter of
  paramount urgency the Air Ministry will consider and
  decide what level of strength is to be left to the
  Fighter Command for the defences of this country, and will  assure me that when this level has been reached, not one  fighter will be sent across the Channel however urgent  and insistent the appeals for help may be.
  10.        I believe that, if an adequate fighter force is  kept in this country, if the fleet remains in being, and  if Home Forces are suitably organised to resist invasion,  we should be able to carry on the war single handed for  some time, if not indefinitely.   But, if the Home Defence Force is drained away in desperate attempts to remedy the  situation in France,  defeat in France will involve the  final, complete and irremediable defeat of this country.
                        I have the honour to be,
                                Your obedient Servant,
                                                                                Air Chief Marshal,
                             Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief,
                                Fighter Command,Royal Air Force.

1 comment:

DerekP said...

Ah, but that was written when many politicians had real world experience outside politics, and therefore had some ability to recognise the facts of a situation, and appreciate the possible consequences (even if they might have needed these pointed out).

How very different from todays politicians who, if they are not professional politicians from the time they applied for (a free or heavily subsidised)university education, probably have their background in PR or Law (which, like the professional politicians, avoid reality by playing self-involved makebelieve to make what they have to live with fit into their vision of what the world should be, and to hell with the rest of us).

How would the Cleggover react to such information were he in that position - well, I think we all know?